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ABSTRACT: Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding 
to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, 
and has received little attention in the literature. We can appeal to theories of explanation 
in the philosophy of science to give us a characterisation of metaphysical explanation, 
but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective 
and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; 
and that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a close connection. Holding 
fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant 
dilemma can be blunted. Consequently, we should reject the assumption that grounding 
relations are mind-independent. 
 
This paper is about the grounding relation and the connection between grounding 
and explanation. Grounding is a relation of non-causal ontological dependence; a 
metaphysical determination relation which obtains between entities of various 
ontological categories including facts, properties, states of affairs, and actual concrete 
objects. Though discussion of grounding has become widespread, much of the 
literature about grounding is devoted to arriving at a proper characterisation of the 
notion. Difficulties arise because grounding is taken to be a metaphysical primitive – it 
resists reductive analysis. This leaves grounding vulnerable to the charge that it has no 
distinctive content, or no useful role to play. In response (as well as pre-emptively) 
grounding has been defended by appeal to intuitive examples of grounding; by 
highlighting the usefulness of a grounding relation; and by connecting grounding to 
other more familiar metaphysical notions. In particular, grounding has been connected 
to the notion of explanation (e.g. Kim, 1994; Fine, 2001; 2012; Schaffer, 2009; 
deRosset, 2010; Audi, 2012).  
To say that x grounds y is to provide some kind of explanation of y in terms of x. 
Defenders of grounding usually insist that the explanation on offer is somehow 
‘metaphysical’. For example, Fine (2012, p. 37) introduces the idea of ontological 
ground as ‘a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and 
explanandum are connected...through some constitutive form of determination’. 
Unfortunately, the precise sense in which the relevant kind of explanation is distinctive 
remains somewhat opaque. I will argue that attempts to specify a notion of 
metaphysical explanation useful for elucidating grounding are bound to fail. 
I. Articulating the problem 
Here are three independently plausible, but jointly problematic theses about 
grounding and explanation: 
(i) There is a tight connection between grounding and metaphysical 
explanation 
(ii) Metaphysical explanation has agent-relative features 
(iii) Grounding is objective and mind-independent 
If grounding is objective and mind-independent, but metaphysical explanation has 
agent-relative features, then it seems the connection between grounding and 
explanation can’t be as close as the literature suggests. If the connection is to be 
maintained along with the objectivity of grounding, then metaphysical explanation 
must be similarly objective and mind-independent. Alternatively, grounding, like 
metaphysical explanation, must have mind-dependent features. Call this tension ‘the 
grounding-explanation problem’. 
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Why believe the three theses of the triad? I have said something about (i) already; it is 
a cornerstone of the grounding literature. The same is true of (iii). Grounding is 
supposed to be a paradigmatically worldly relation; grounding relations limn the 
structure of reality. The only controversial claim amongst the three theses is the 
second; that metaphysical explanation has pragmatic or agent-relative features. Let’s 
consider the problem in the form of a dilemma. Assume (iii). We must now either deny 
(i), or deny (ii). Since we’ve noted that (ii) is the more controversial of the two, we’ll 
start there. 
II. First Horn: metaphysical explanation 
Why accept that explanation, and in particular metaphysical explanation, has pragmatic 
features? A quick survey of the literature on ordinary explanation (which I do not have 
the space to rehearse here) reveals that all the major theories of explanation build 
features of the explanation-seeker into their account of successful explanation. 
Explanations are successful when they move the explanation-seeker to expect or 
understand the explanandum on the basis of the explanans. Expectation and 
understanding are agent-relative notions. 
Two things remain thus far unexplained. First, why is it successful explanation, rather 
than mere explanation that we are interested in? Second, why should we think that 
metaphysical explanation has pragmatic features, even granting that ordinary 
explanation does? To keep us on our toes, I’ll discuss the second of these first. 
Any defender of the connection between grounding and metaphysical explanation 
must have one of two things in mind. First, they might think that metaphysical 
explanation is like ordinary explanation, but in some kind of metaphysical context. 
Thus, the better understood notion of explanation helps elucidate the more 
problematic notion of grounding. Alternatively, they might think that metaphysical 
explanation is a special kind of explanation distinct from the ordinary conception.  
The problem with this second view is that it is the aspect of metaphysical explanation 
which is akin to ordinary explanation (e.g. intuitive understanding of terms such as 
‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’; formal features such as asymmetry, transitivity, non-
monotonicity and hyperintensionality; and a sense of what it is to convey answers to 
why-questions) that allows us our intuitive grasp on metaphysical explanation in the 
first place. Success in arguing that metaphysical explanation is distinct from ordinary 
forms of explanation means that we lose our grasp on what metaphysical explanation 
actually is, and so it is very hard to see how the connection between ground and 
metaphysical explanation could shed light on grounding. The connection between 
grounding and explanation is only illuminating in so far as the relevant form of 
explanation is similar enough to our ordinary conception for us to understand it. 
If metaphysical explanation is like ordinary explanation but in a metaphysical context, 
then (assuming we can meet the challenge of specifying what this context is) the 
problem is that metaphysical explanation, like ordinary explanation, will have 
pragmatic features. What makes for successful metaphysical explanation will depend 
(to an extent) on features of agents. If the connection between grounding and 
explanation is as close as (i) in our original triad suggests, then grounding too has 
pragmatic features. But that straightforwardly contradicts (iii) – grounding relations are 
supposed to be entirely objective and mind-independent. 
So if metaphysical explanation is to elucidate grounding, then it can’t be a form of 
explanation entirely distinct from our ordinary conception. But if it’s like our ordinary 
conception, then it seems that metaphysical explanation and hence grounding has 
agent-relative features. Perhaps we can escape this troubling consequence by pressing 
the second of the points with which we began our discussion of metaphysical 
explanation; a distinction between explanation and successful explanation.  
Defenders of the causal theory of explanation (e.g. Lewis, 1986) claim that explaining 
some event involves citing a portion of its causal history. Successfully explaining some 
event involves citing a relevant portion of that history, where relevance varies with 
context. Can we not then say that the entire grounding chain of some entity 
metaphysically explains it, and avoid having to say that metaphysical explanation has 
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any pragmatic features? Perhaps, but this proposal won’t give us what we need to 
maintain that we can look to explanation to tell us about grounding. 
Defenders of the grounding-explanation link think that by reflecting on what 
metaphysically explains what, we can find out what grounds what. But all that is 
apparent to us is successful explanation. If we are to appeal to features of explanation to 
elucidate grounding, it must be the features of successful explanation that we appeal to 
(since these are the ones we are aware of). But as we have seen, what it is for an 
explanation to be successful varies with context, and so any useful connection between 
grounding and metaphysical explanation is a connection between grounding and an 
agent-relative notion of explanation. Attempts to reject the first horn of our dilemma 
are unsuccessful; metaphysical explanation does have agent-relative features. 
III. Second horn: the grounding-explanation connection 
It is unappealing to deny that metaphysical explanation has some agent-relative 
features, and so to resolve the grounding-explanation problem we must now consider 
re-evaluating the purported link between grounding and metaphysical explanation. I 
take it that there are broadly three ways to understand the connection. First, we can 
think of metaphysical explanations are tracking grounding relations. Second, we might 
think that grounding relations have a closer connection to explanation such that the 
grounding relation just is an explanatory relation. Both accounts of the grounding-
explanation connection can find support in the literature. Alternatively, we can deny 
that grounding and explanation are closely connected at all. I’ll return to this third 
option at the end of the section. 
Take the first view. Audi (2012) insists that ‘grounding is not a form of explanation, 
even though it is intimately connected with explanation (p. 119)... an explanation...is 
something you can literally know; a grounding relation is something you can merely 
know about (p. 120)’. A metaphysical explanation might be a proposition expressing the 
grounding relation, but is not the relation itself.  
We rely on intuitions about what explains what in order to tell us what grounds what. 
Furthermore, we rely on what we know about explanation (formal features and so on) 
to give us a characterisation of grounding. If metaphysical explanations merely track 
grounding relations, then our reliance on features of explanation for our understanding 
of grounding is illegitimate. There is far more scope for error in our judgements about 
grounding than we ought to consider acceptable. There is an epistemic gap between 
judgements of ground and judgements of explanation that is not present if grounding 
just is a form of explanation, and it is especially troubling given the limited supply of 
alternative methods for discovering facts about grounding. Tracking conceptions of 
metaphysical explanation rob us of the special insight into grounding that metaphysical 
explanation has been supposed to provide. 
In response to such concerns, a defender of the tracking conception of the link might 
stress that the grounding-explanation connection is very tight. Perhaps there is 
something like a necessary connection between grounding and metaphysical 
explanation, so that whenever there is a grounding relation there will a metaphysical 
explanation that corresponds to it. But in so tightening the link, other difficulties arise. 
These are held in common with those who think grounding just is an explanatory 
relation. 
One of the main problems we encounter was discussed in the previous section; the 
agent-relativity of metaphysical explanation infects grounding, contradicting its 
assumed mind-independence and objectivity. A second problem is epistemic, and 
concerns the nature of the grounding relation. 
In the grounding literature, appeals to the grounding-explanation connection are 
often made in order to specify formal features of the grounding relation (e.g. 
irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, hyperintensionality and non-monotonicity) (see 
e.g. Rosen, 2010). Our understanding of the nature of the grounding relation is 
coloured by our understanding of the nature of metaphysical explanation. A tight 
conception of the grounding-explanation connection means we cannot untangle agent-
relative features from the rest.  
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Consider the common contention that grounding is asymmetric because explanation 
is asymmetric (e.g Audi, 2012, p. 102; Lowe, 2010). Symmetric explanations are 
considered bad explanations because they fail to provide us with any new information. 
It might be, however, that some cases of symmetrical grounding ought to be 
considered quite plausible (e.g. Thompson, 2016). If it were true that symmetries are 
ruled out of explanations on epistemic grounds, but there are cases of symmetrical 
grounding, then the epistemic features of explanation would be influencing our 
theorising about grounding in a way that led us to believe false things about the 
grounding relation (i.e. that it is symmetric rather than nonsymmetric). 
All of this suggests the possibility of severing the link between grounding and 
explanation, and maintaining that the two concepts are independent and distinct 
(though they may of course be similar in various respects). The upshot of this would 
be that it would not be safe to infer anything about the character of grounding 
relations from that of explanation, and that any appeal to our intuitive sense of what is 
explanatory in a given context ought to lend at most little credence to our judgements 
about grounding.  
The major problem with this strategy is that it robs us of one of the most prominent 
approaches to making sense of the grounding relation. As we are now well aware, a 
crucial way to understand grounding is via its connection to explanation. If the 
connection is severed, the notion of grounding is once more rendered obscure. 
Without the grounding-explanation link, our understanding of grounding must come 
from other sources that do not make appeal to the explanatory character of 
grounding.1 
IV. Conclusion 
Not much attention has been paid to the nature of metaphysical explanation in the 
literature. Appeals to metaphysical explanation are made in order to shed light on the 
notion of grounding, but investigation into the nature of metaphysical explanation 
uncovers the grounding-explanation problem – a tension between our attitude to 
explanation, realism about grounding, and the purported link between grounding and 
explanation. To attempt to solve the problem, we held fixed the thesis that grounding 
is mind-independent and grappled with the resultant dilemma. Since we found no way 
to blunt either horn, the only thing left to do is to reject the assumption of the mind-
independency of grounding with which we began.2  
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1 Such attempts have been made, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, without 
the grounding-explanation connection, the project of making grounding intelligible is severely 
damaged. 
2 Thanks to Darragh Byrne, Nicholas K. Jones, Penelope Mackie, Alexander Skiles, Pekka Väyrynen 
and Alastair Wilson, audiences in Barcelona, Birmingham, and Hamburg, and at the 2015 SWIP 
workshop in York, and the 2015 Joint Session in Warwick. 
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